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Lightweight and Secure Session-Key Establishment
Scheme in Smart Home Environments
Pardeep Kumar, Member, IEEE, Andrei Gurtov, Senior Member, IEEE, Jari Iinatti, Senior Member, IEEE,
Mika Ylianttila, Senior Member, IEEE, and Mangal Sain
Abstract— The proliferation of current wireless communica-
tions and information technologies have been altering humans
lifestyle and social interactions—the next frontier is the smart
home environments or spaces. A smart home consists of low
capacity devices (e.g., sensors) and wireless networks, and there-
fore, all working together as a secure system that needs an
adequate level of security. This paper introduces lightweight
and secure session key establishment scheme for smart home
environments. To establish trust among the network, every sensor
and control unit uses a short authentication token and establishes
a secure session key. The proposed scheme provides impor-
tant security attributes including prevention of various popular
attacks, such as denial-of-service and eavesdropping attacks. The
preliminary evaluation and feasibility tests are demonstrated by
the proof-of-concept implementation. In addition, the proposed
scheme attains both computation efficiency and communication
efficiency as compared with other schemes from the literature.
Index Terms— Authentication, access control, security, smart
homes, wireless sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, the advancement in electronics,communications and information technologies and
the Internet have led to the rapid proliferation of smart
home environments. The smart home environments are
envisioned as being able to exhibit various forms of advanced
intelligence by enhancing traditional home automation
systems with new smart functions and services addressing
diverse high-level goals of well-being like increasing comfort,
reducing operational costs, and guaranteeing safety and
security of the inhabitants.
Such smart homes have great possibilities to enable a variety
of use cases, e.g., light control system, appliance control
system, climate control, multimedia system, smart energy sys-
tem, and security and safety system [1]–[3]. Moreover, there
is a tremendous business/research potential for the smart
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Fig. 1. Smart home environment.
appliances in home environments that can give an independent
life to the elderly and disabled people [4]. A smart home
can also provide a remote care to a resident suffering from
a cognitive deficit to complete his activities of daily living
activities (ADL) [1], [5]. Recently, several research projects
have been initiated to develop the smart homes, e.g., HOPE
(smart home for elderly people) [6], SM4ALL (smart home
for all) [7] and GENIO (next generation home) [8], etc.
Typically, a smart home network consists of a number
of heterogeneous smart devices, such as, low-cost sensor,
actuator, smart light, smart window shutter, smart thermostat
and surveillance camera or other type of smart devices that
are integrated with intelligence, as shown in Fig. 1. Note that
home environments and networks are used interchangeably.
Most of the devices are having resource-limitations (e.g.,
computational power, bandwidth, and battery power) [9]. How-
ever, in such home networks, the SDs communicate over the
wireless channels through the local home gateway. The home
gateway acts as a bridge between the SDs and the users, and
provides interoperability and control for the SDs, connect to
the outer world via the Internet [10], [11]. Thus the novelties
of SDs are enabling users to operate homes (or to monitor
elderly and disabled people) remotely/directly using the smart
phones, tablets, or through designated web apps, anywhere and
anytime.
Nevertheless, smart homes open up an attack surface as the
SDs data collected and communicated over insecure wireless
networks, leaving them vulnerable to security attacks. The
1530-437X © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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ability for an unauthorized user to remotely monitor or con-
trol video and audio within a household would concern an
owner. As such, an attacker may profit financially by selling
the individual data obtained via eavesdropping on the smart
home area networks. Maliciously heating or cooling a home
at the extreme temperatures both increases utility costs and
added additional strain on the heating, ventilating, and air
conditioning (HVAC) systems [12]. However, there are several
security challenges in an interconnected smart homes due to
the lack of security standards of the SDs. Furthermore, most of
the SDs are incompatible with standard networking protocols,
which makes them susceptible to a number of security threats.
In [13], Chen and Luo pointed out that the smart appliances
(devices) are not yet equipped with enough security protection
mechanisms. For instance, a smart meter follows the remote
control commands without verifying the authenticity of such
commands. Moreover, in such smart spaces, the threats arise
due to inadequate designing of the security protocol in lossy
smart devices. On the other hand, resource constrained nature
of a SD makes it challenging to meet robust security because
of the lower processor speed, a small amount of memory and
a low link bandwidth.
Although, in recent years a significant amount of works
guided towards the smart home security [2], [12]–[18], most of
the approaches, e.g., [2], [14]–[16] incurred the high amount of
overhead to perform the device authentication and leaving out
other security properties. Additionally, the studies so far only
consider eavesdropping adversaries, SD compromise is not
considered as a part of the threat model, which could be a more
severe threat to the smart homes. Furthermore, how the poor
security protocols can be abused to control the SDs are shown
in [19] and [20], thus breaches the smart homes security.
Apparently with regards to the technological advancements, it
appears that the smart homes are vulnerable to unauthorized
access (i.e., because all the entities are not trusted) and
security attacks. As a result, preventing the SDs sensitive data
from being revealed to an adversary over insecure wireless
channels, an adequate security is highly required from the
very beginning of a home network deployment — that verify
whether the entities involved in a smart home are the exact
parties they appear to be.
To satisfy an adequate level of security, this paper presents
a lightweight and secure session key establishment scheme.
The scheme allows each entity should be performed a light-
weight mutual authentication prior participation in the home
network and establish a session key in a secure manner.
To verify the device authentication and message integrity, we
utilize the smart device’s unique and immutable identifier,
hereafter denoted as its Silicon ID (i.e., a silicon serial chip
number [21]). Unlike the other protocols, the proposed scheme
uses the symmetric key cryptography [22] and a hash function
to compliment other techniques in order to provide robust
security in the smart homes. In addition, a new device can
be easily entered arbitrarily and configured securely into the
scheme to extend the smart home services. The security
attributes (i.e., authentication and confidentiality) are formally
verified using the AVISPA tool [23]. Then, the security
analysis shows that the proposed scheme is secure against the
Dolev-Yao attack model [24]. The performance and efficiency
of the proposed scheme are evaluated using the test bed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the works that are relevant to this paper, and
Section III shows system design and security properties.
Section IV presents the proposed scheme, and Section V shows
the proposed scheme analysis. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
An enormous number of works incorporating security
features in the smart home applications have been proposed,
each scheme has its own merits and demerits. However, this
paper describes those literatures that are recently proposed
for the smart home area networks, and for the smart home
appliances.
Gomez and Paradells [1] discussed a different types of
wireless home automation network architectures and
technologies, including security obstacles of the ZigBee,
INSTEON, Wavenis and Z-wave, and for the IP-based
technologies. Similar to [1], Ayday-Rajagopal has also
noticed that the existing home area network (HAN) protocols
(ZigBee, Z-wave, and INSTEON) support security only up
to a certain level [25]. They introduced three different secure
device authentication mechanisms for smart grid-enabled
HAN. For example, (1) authentication mechanism between
the gateway and the smart meter; (2) authentication between
the smart appliances and the HAN; and (3) authentication
between the transient devices and the HAN. However, to
perform the authentication, the schemes presented in [25]
are (heavily) depending on 3rd party (such as, the Internet
service provider, or telecommunication companies), and then
it providing security to the HAN.
The security scheme in [13] aimed a secure smart household
appliances framework, named S2A. The authors conceptually
focused on the usability, controlling electricity prices, and
operational safety for the smart devices (i.e., appliances).
By employing a machine learning method, the S2A framework
provides an effective and reliable security protection. However,
it (S2A) does not consider the fundamental security properties
(i.e., device authentication, data confidentiality, and integrity),
which means the framework may not withstand under a
collaborative adversary model (e.g., the Dolev-Yao model).
Vaidya et al. [15] proposed a device authentication
mechanism for smart energy HANs. Based on the elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC), each device has access to a cer-
tificate authority to obtain an implicit certificate. A session
key is established between two involved entities. Authors
claimed their scheme is efficient compared to other existing
schemes. However, security analysis did not provide much
details — how their device authentication is secure against
attacks, and how the scheme is efficient than others.
Han et al. [16] presented a novel secure key pairing
protocol for radio frequency for consumer electronics (RF4CE)
ubiquitous smart home system. Different consumer electronics
devices (e.g., 802.15.4) are forming a smart home network.
In the scheme, each device sends own authentication informa-
tion to a mobile operator (MO) to be authenticated. After the
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first-level of authentication, MO sends the device information
further to the device manufacturers to be authenticated, again.
The proposed scheme is based on the symmetric key cryptog-
raphy, which is easy to implement in a home environment.
However, the main requirement of Han et al.’s scheme is
that the manufacturers have to be always online, it may
not be always pragmatical. In addition, the communication
costs of their proposed scheme would be expensive for the
low-resource devices.
Guillet et al. [17] developed a correct by construction
security approach to design a fault tolerant smart home
for the disabled people. The proposed scheme exploits a
formal technique named discrete controller synthesis (DCS)
to automatically control the devices. To control a device,
authors presented two types of security constraints expressed
as boolean expressions: (i) hypothesis (supposed to remain
true for all execution); and (ii) guarantee (enforced to remain
true using DCS if and only if the hypothesis stays true), for
a detailed information, reader may refer to [17]. Though, the
scheme employing formal techniques and boolean expressions
to control the devices states (e.g., on/off), the authenticity
of boolean expressions are not being verified. Therefore the
scheme may not work under active attacks.
Kim et al. [2] presented a seamless integration of
heterogeneous devices and access control in smart home.
Authors observed that there is a lack of the de facto communi-
cation standard in the interoperability of device from different
vendors in the smart homes. Therefore, based on the open
services gateway initiative (OSGi) they proposed a smart home
architecture that integrates heterogeneous protocols in the
HAN. In their architecture, an access control model manages
authentication and authorization for different users’ requests.
In addition, the remote access is available only through the
Restful web services. However, this scheme did not consider a
device authentication at the time of home network deployment.
Based on ECC, Li’s [14] designed a key establishment
protocol for smart home energy management system. The
scheme consists of two entities, a node and a security manager.
Each entity obtains public and private keys through an out-of-
band channel from a trusted certificate authority. However, the
security analysis of Li’s scheme is very limited. In addition,
the public key operations are still too expensive for a sensor,
in terms of the time complexity.
In another research, Fabian and Feldhaus [18] proposed
a peer-to-peer privacy-preserving data infrastructure for the
smart home appliances. Their scheme uses a distributed hash
table (DHT) and provides anonymity to the smart home
appliances using RFID (radio frequency identification).
Different from the literature survey, in this paper we envi-
sion that there is still an immense need of lightweight security
mechanism in the smart home networks (from the beginning
of SDs deployment) that could be a trade-off between security
and efficiency for the resource-constrained SDs.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN AND SECURITY PROPERTIES
A. System Design
Consider a smart home internal network that comprises of N
number of heterogeneous SDs (temperature sensor, smart light,
Fig. 2. SD-to-HG communication pattern in smart home.
multimedia device, and the home gateway, etc.). As shown
in Fig. 2, the resource-constrained SDs are communicating to
the home gateway (HG) over the wireless channels using a
HAN protocol (e.g., ZigBee) [10], [25]–[28]. The communi-
cation pattern named as SD-To-HG [10]. With the hand-held
devices (e.g., smart phone and laptop), a user can monitor
and operate the SDs either directly or remotely through the
home gateway, which is connected to the Internet (IPv4/IPv6).
In addition, the SDs would be controlled easily in an ad-hoc
manner.
As shown in Fig. 2, three entities are mainly involved in a
smart home environment, as follows.
1) The SD forwards home data to the home gateway using
a single-hop link. Similarly, the home gateway can
perform queries to the SDs, whenever needed.
2) The home gateway is a special node that takes
responsibility of controlling the network data, device and
network interoperability, and security management [3].
In addition, the gateway works as a router between
the SDs and the end users. It has two wireless inter-
faces: (i) a short-range wireless interface (e.g., 802.15.4)
maintains the connection within the internal (smart)
devices, and (ii) a long-range communication interface
(e.g., Wi-Fi/GPRS) maintains a connection with the
outer world [29].
3) Security service provider is a trusted server, and is
responsible for generating and assigning the keying
material to the smart home entities.
B. Security Properties
A number of recent works (e.g., [3], [22]) have identified
the detailed account of major security properties that should
be considered from the beginning of a smart home internal
networking, as follows.
1) Mutual Authentication: In a smart home, an adversary
may pretend to be another legal entity in order to
obtain the SDs sensitive data regarding the smart home
services. Therefore, each SD should perform the mutual
authentication and verify the legitimacy of involved enti-
ties. Thus it can prohibit unauthorized network access
from the adversaries or compromised devices.
2) Session Key Establishment: After performing
identification and verification processes, the legal
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entities should be agreed on a session key that can
ensure security for further communications between the
legitimate entities.
3) Message Confidentiality: In a smart home network, since
the SDs collect and forward sensitive data wirelessly
to the home gateway, an adversary (eavesdropper) may
enable indirect surveillance on the resident and appli-
ances activities by monitoring the wireless channels [3].
Thus, the protocol messages are vulnerable to informa-
tion leakage (and eavesdropping) attacks. The standard
approach to protect the devices data is message confi-
dentiality [14] that could avoid the eavesdropping attacks
on the smart home networks.
4) Message Integrity: The inhabitants living in a smart
home are relying on the SDs data, keeping confidential-
ity does not protect the data from external modifications
(e.g., data tampering). Message integrity would ensure
to the receiver that received data is not altered by an
attacker while in transit.
5) Message Freshness: Perrig et al. [30] suggested that it is
not sufficient to guarantee only message confidentiality
and authentication but an adequate security protocol
must ensure freshness of each received message.
6) Lightweightness: The security protocols are an over-
head to the applications, therefore authentication and
session key establishment should be lightweight (and/or
energy-efficient), particularly for the resource-hungry
SDs [31].
7) Safeguard to Popular Attacks: Clearly, the security
scheme should resist to different popular attacks,
e.g., masquerade, message forgery, message replay,
known-key, node compromise and denial-of-service.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
To provide an adequate security in the smart homes
(refer Fig. 2), this section presents the proposed
scheme that satisfies all the security properties outlined
in Sub-section III-B. The smart devices are to be authenticated
prior to their participation from the very beginning of the
home network deployment. The proposed scheme can enable
in many use-cases, e.g., light system, appliance control
system, climate control system, home-care, activities of daily
living (ADL), smart energy system, and security and safety
system. Table I defines the used symbols and our assumptions
are followings.
1) The SP and the HG are trusted entities, and are
connected securely with each other. The HG is a tamper-
proof device that can protect the sensitive data.
2) The HG and the SDs are having identical symmetric
cryptographic systems (i.e., encryption, decryption and
hash function).
3) All the heterogeneous devices (i.e., SDs and HG) clocks
are synchronized using the scheme of Li et al. [32], and
are (mutually) agreed on a transmission delay (T ) to
avoid replay attacks.
Our scheme including three phases: the system setup; authen-
tication and key establishment; and ease of addition of a new
smart device.
TABLE I
SYMBOLS AND DESCRIPTIONS
Fig. 3. System setup.
A. System Setup
First of all, each home device should be registered off-line
to the security service provider (SP) and obtained security
parameters. Prior to the network deployment, for every smart
device A, firstly, SP assigns identity (idA), and stores a unique
secret key (K A) along with key identifier (K Aid ) to the device
memory [33]. SP generates a unique short authentication
token (token A) and computes Q A = h(token A||Gid ||SidA).
Note that, SidA is a Silicon-ID (a silicon serial number) that
presented on the devices [21]. Then, SP stores T oken A and
idA to device A. In addition, SP also stores the HG identity
(Gid ) to device A. Secondly, SP stores each A’s assigned
identity (idA), Q A and key (K A) along with its key identifier
(K Aid ) to the home gateway (HG). Finally, SP maintains a
database that keeps record of the deployed devices. For the
smart home security purposes, it is practical to assume that
all the stored keys have their life-time (e.g., 6 to 12 months),
which depends on the SP. Fig. 3 depicts the system setup.
B. Authentication and Key Establishment
To maintain an initial trust among the smart devices, this
sub-section presents an authentication and key establishment
mechanism. Assume the HG wants to start bootstrapping with
the device A, as follows.
S1: HG generates a random nonce r and computes
C = M AC[Q A, Gid ||idA||T 1||r ] and sends a request
{Gid , C, T 1, r} message to the device A. Here T 1 is
the current timestamp of HG.
S2: Upon receiving request message from HG, device A
checks (T 2 − T 1) ≤ T , if yes then proceeds to the
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Fig. 4. Flowchart of proposed scheme.
next step. Computes Q A′ = h(token A||Gid ||SidA) and
C∗ = M AC [Q A′ , Gid ||idA||T 1||r ]. Verifies C = C∗,
if not, then it generates a false message and terminates
the system. Otherwise, the device A generates a random
secret s and computes NA = EK A[idA, s, r, T 2] and
tag = H M AC [Q A′ , idA||Gid ||s||r ||T 2], and sends a
response message (i.e., {Kid A, NA, tag, T 2}) to the HG.
Here T 2 is the current timestamp of device A.
S3: HG checks (T 3 − T 2) ≤ T , if hold then retrieves
the corresponding key (K A) of Kid A from own data-
base and decrypts NA to obtain idA∗, s, r∗, T 2∗. Now
it verifies the following, T 2∗ = T 2, idA∗ = idA and
r∗ = r , if not then aborts the system. Else it verifies
(H M AC[Q A, idA∗||Gid ||s||r ||T 2]) = tag∗. It generates
the session key σ = h(idA||Gid ||s||T 3||T 2||Q A) and
computes NHG = EK A[σ, s, T 3], and then it sends a
notify message {NHG , T 3} to the device A. Here, T 3 is
a current timestamp of the HG.
S4: Upon receiving notify from the HG, device A checks
(T 4 − T 3) ≤ T , if it holds then decrypts NHG
using K A and obtains σ ∗, s∗ and T 3∗. Verifies
T 3∗ = T 3, s∗ = s, if yes then the session key
(i.e., σ = (h(idA||Gid ||s||T 3∗||T 2||Q A∗))) will be
securely established between the two legal entities. Here,
T 4 is the current timestamp of device A. Fig. 4 depicts
the flowchart of session key establishment scheme.
C. Ease of Addition a New Smart Device
It is practical that a new wireless smart device can join the
smart home arbitrarily. The proposed scheme provides an ease
Fig. 5. Flow of addition a new smart device: Session key establishment.
of addition a new device (e.g., J) in the smart homes. To do
this, the SP will initiate the followings. First, the SP will
assign identities (idJ , Gid ) and embed required security-
related (K J , K jid , T oken J ) credential to the new device (J).
Then, the SP securely passes J’s information to the home gate-
way (i.e., idJ , K J , K jid , and Q J (= h(token J ||Gid ||SidJ ))
and deploys the new device. Then, the HG and the new device
will perform the same above mentioned procedure. The flow
of new device addition is shown in Fig. 5.
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION, SECURITY AND
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section is divided into three-fold: (a) formal analysis,
(b) security properties and (c) performance analysis.
A. Formal Verification
In general, a formal verification ensures the whole security
protocol behaves as expected or not, whereas using simulation
or testing, a user can point out the errors only. Therefore, to
find the design flaws, a formal verification is highly required
before the real implementation or prototype. This sub-section
presents a formal verification of the proposed scheme using
automated validation of Internet security protocols and appli-
cation (AVISPA) security analyzer tool [23]. The AVISPA tool
has been used to analyze many of the security protocols,
which are standardized by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF). In addition, this tool also have been used in aca-
demic research to verify the security protocols, e.g., [34], [35].
AVISPA integrates automatic security protocol analysis and
verification backends. The backends are names as on-the-
fly model-checker (OFMC), Constraint-logic-based attack
searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based model-checker (SATMC),
and tree automata based on automatic approximations of the
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Fig. 6. Goal: confidentiality and authentication.
Fig. 7. Safe from Dolev-Yao attack model.
analysis of security protocols (TA4SP). AVISPA uses a high
level protocol specification language (HLPSL) for security
protocol specification. For more details, refer to [23].
The HLPSL is a role-based language, meaning that it
specifies the actions of each participant in a module that is
called a basic role. The basic role describes what information
the participant can use initially (parameters), its initial state,
and ways in which the transition can take place. The com-
position role describes a whole single session of the protocol
by specifying how the legitimate participants are interacting
with each other. In addition, a top-level role (i.e., environment
role) contains global constants and a composition of one
or more sessions, where the attacker may play some roles
as a legitimate user. It also describes what knowledge the
intruder has about the networks. In AVISPA [23], the attacker
is modeled through the channel(dy) that is being used for the
Dolev-Yao Intruder model [24].
However, in the HLPSL specification our proposed scheme
has two basic roles (i.e., HG and device A), a single session
role and an environment role that have the knowledge of the
Dolev-Yao attack model. For the validation and testing, we
have transformed the HLPSL script into IF (i.e., intermediate
format) using the translator HLPSL2IF. This translated IF code
is the input of four backends (OFMC, CL-AtSe, SATMC, and
TA4SP) that are integrated with the AVISPA tool.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 are showing the formal verification
results, confidentiality and authentication, and safe from the
Dolev-Yao attack model, respectively. More precisely, as
shown in Fig. 6, the message confidentiality is modeled by
means of the goal predicate secrecy of request (Gid , C, T 1, r),
response (K idA, NA, tag, T 2) and notify (NHG , T 3)
messages that means the parameters are enough secret
(and/or secured) between the HG and the device A. Similarly,
authentication is modeled by means of the goal predicate
authenticate Gid , NA, T ag, which states that the device A
verified the HG identity (Gid ) and the HG verified the
device A using (NA). On the other hand, the proposed
protocol has reported safe in the OFMC backend and the
proposed scheme meets specified goals successfully, as
depicted in Fig. 7. Likewise OFMC, the CL-AtSe and
SATMC backends are being reported safe, whereas the
TA4SP backend has reported not_supported and it produced
inconclusive results. Hence, the Dolev-Yao attack model
cannot harm on the proposed scheme. Note that a web-based
interface for running the AVISPA tool available [36].
B. Security Analysis
This section discusses the resilience against possible attacks
(e.g., masquerade, message-forgery, message replay,
known-key, device compromise and denial-of-service).
Further, we will also analyze the security properties
(mutual authentication, session-key establishment, message
confidentiality, message integrity and freshness) to check
whether the proposed scheme can be satisfied, as mentioned
in Section III-B.
To analyze security of the proposed scheme, consider the
Dolev-Yao threat model where an attacker can eavesdrop on
wireless messages, intercept and inject(/or) modify packets in
transit [24]. In addition, an attacker may physically capture
a smart device, compromise the stored secret information for
controlling the entire smart home functionalities.
Proposition: The proposed scheme resilient to masquerade
attack and message-forgery attack between HG and device A.
Proof:
(1) Resist Masquerade Attack: The attacker cannot mas-
querade as the legal entity between the HG and the device
A to join in the smart home network. Assume that an
adversary (Tom) intercepts a request message {Gid , C, T 1, r},
during one of HG’s past requests. Then, Tom may initiate a
masquerade attack to join the smart device A as a legal entity,
he sends a fake request {GidT om, CT om, T 1T om, rT om} to the
device A, by following the procedure described in step: S1
(Section IV-B). However, in this fake attempt Tom will
be faced difficulties in his request message verification,
as follows:
(a) Device A cannot verify Tom’s phony identity (GidT om),
because the real HG identity information (Gid ) is hidden
in C(i.e., M AC[Q A, Gid ||idA||T 1||r ]). Here, we can notice
that Tom’s phony identity (GidT om) cannot help him to pass
this fake attempt. Moreover, to generate the same MAC
(i.e., M AC[Q A, Gid ||idA||T 1||r ])), Tom must know how to
compute Q A, otherwise, he cannot pass authentication at the
device A. For instance, Tom’s sub-message (CT om) will not be
verified during the MAC verification procedure at device A,
since (CT om) is computed over a garbled key. Thus, Tom will
be detected and then the device A will terminate the session.
(b) As long as Tom does not possess the real para-
meters (token A, Gid , SidA), he cannot deduce the original
Q A(= h(token A||Gid ||SidA)), which is a one-way hashed
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value and its possessed by the legal entities only (service
provider, HG, and device A). Therefore, Tom cannot mas-
querade as a legal HG to join the device A in a smart home
network.
Similarly, Tom intercepts a response {Kid , NA, tag, T 2}
message between the device A and the HG to join the home
gateway. From step: S2 (Section IV-B), it can be observed that
as a matter of fact, Tom can capture the response message,
nevertheless he cannot read the contents (idA, s, r, T 2) of
sub-message (i.e., NA) since it is encrypted by the unique
key (K A) that shared between the legal HG and the device A.
Therefore, our scheme can resist the masquerade attack.
(2) Resist Message-Forgery Attack: Assuming that Tom
may capture previous legal messages (request and response)
passing between the HG and the device A. He would inten-
tionally attempt to forge all the relevant parameters, e.g.,
C (= M AC[Q A, Gid ||idA||T 1||r ]) from the request
message, and tag (= H M AC[Q A, idA||Gid ||s||r ||T 2]) from
the response message. To breach message integrity, then Tom
sends a forged request message {Gid , CT om, T 1, rT om} to the
device A by following S1 in Section IV-B. However, the forged
CT om (= M ACT om[Q AT om, Gid ||idA||T 1||rT om]) will be
easily detected at the device A because CT om is not computed
using the original Q A (e.g., M AC[Q A, Gid ||idA||T 1||r ]).
Therefore, the device A will generate a “False” message and
terminate the system.
Similarly, Tom tries to send a forged response message
{Kid , NA, tagT om, T 2} to the home gateway as described in
S2 (refer Section IV-B). Likewise CT om , the sub-message
tagT om(= H M AC[Q AT om, idA||Gid ||s||r ||T 2]) will not be
verified at the HG, since tagT om is computed over Tom’s fake
value (Q AT om). Hence, the HG will terminate the system.
More precisely, the HG and device A can mutually authen-
ticate each other if and only if they could provide their
correct messages, i.e., C = M AC[Q A, Gid ||idA||T 1||r ]) and
tag = H M AC[Q A′ , idA||Gid ||s||r ||T 2] that are computed
over their shared secrets. In addition, with the effects of mutual
authentication our scheme also resists the man-in-the-middle
attack, and hence safe to message forgery attack. 
Proposition: The proposed scheme is secure against replay
attack and known-key attack.
Proof:
(1) Resist Replay Attack: In the proposed scheme,
Tom can intercept request {Gid , C, T 1, r}, response {Kid A,
NA, tag, T 2} and notify {NHG , T 3} messages and can initiate
replay attack by sending them without modification. Following
the Section IV-B, Tom tries to resend request message, i.e.,
{Gid , C, TT om, r} at the time TT om to the device A. The
verification of replayed message cannot be passed due to
the time interval (T 2 − TT om)  T at the device A,
here T is a mutually agreed transmission delay between
the legal entities and the receiver (device A) will reject
the message. Moreover, to generate a MAC including TT om
(i.e., M AC[Q A, Gid ||idA||TT om ||r ])), Tom must know how
to compute Q A, otherwise, he cannot replay the message.
Similarly, assumed that Tom captures device A mes-
sage, i.e., response {Kid A, NA, tag, T 2T om} and then tries
to replay captured message to the HG at the time T 2T om .
However, Tom’s attempts will be detected when the HG checks
the timestamp of device A, i.e., (T 3 − T 2T om)  T ,
where T is mutually agreed transmission delay. Moreover,
when the HG decrypts NA to obtain idA∗, s, r∗, T 2∗, Tom’s
attempt will be detected because T 2T om will not be verified
(T 2∗ = T 2T om). Likewise, the message notify {NHG , T 3}
resists to message replay attack.
(2) Known-Key Attack: In this attack, considered Tom has
eavesdropped on wireless messages and studied some other
session keys. However, our scheme uses the timestamp (of
both entities) and ephemeral random secret s (of device A) in
each session. We can note that the timestamp and random
secret (s) are independent for each session, therefore, the
secure session key σ (= h(idA||Gid ||s||T 3||T 2||Q A)) is
independent and different for every session. If Tom gets a
past session key σ , he/she cannot get s, Q A and idA from
the session key they are embedded in σ , which is protected
by the one-way hash function as shown in S3 (Section IV-B).
Therefore having the knowledge of previous session keys does
not help to originate a new session. 
Proposition: Security against other threats: device compro-
mised threat and denial-of-service threat.
Proof:
(1) Smart Device Compromised Threat: Assumed that Tom
can capture the SD and may try to collect secret information
from the device. It is well known that physical attacks are
difficult to prevent if smart devices are not tamper-proof [37].
However, the proposed scheme relies on the SD-To-HG com-
munication architecture [10], where each smart device stores
a unique key that is shared with the HG. Therefore, no
communication exists between two SDs [38] — means the
proposed scheme can increase the network resilience against
a node compromise threat. On the other hand, the identity
of the SD being authenticated using its Silicon-ID (Sid),
which is a unique and immutable identity [21], thus, any SD’s
(e.g., Device A have an unique Q A = h(token A||Gid ||SidA))
compromising cannot compromise the secure communication
between other non-compromised SDs (e.g., Device B). More-
over, in smart home settings, the SDs are physically secure
since they are usually located inside the home where the HG
can check at regular interval whether the SD is misbehaving
using the scheme proposed in [39].
(2) Denial-of-Service (DoS) Threat: In this attack, Tom can
launch a DoS attack by replaying old message. However, the
scheme proposed in this paper can mitigate to DoS attack to
some extent. As described in the Section IV-B, the proposed
approach exploits the advantages of timestamps, e.g., T 1 and
T 3, T 2 and T 4 of the HG and device A, respectively. The
proposed scheme can resist such DoS attacks. 
Proposition: Achieved mutual authentication and estab-
lished a secure session key between the HG and device A.
Proof:
(1) Proper Mutual Authentication: To prohibit unauthorized
access in smart home network, a proper mutual authentication
is an important property that verifies authenticity for the
involved parties. In the proposed scheme, mutual authenti-
cation between the HG and smart device A ensures trust of
both communication entities. Upon receiving the first message,
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i.e., request ({Gid , C, T 1, r}), device A computes Q A′ and
verifies (C∗ = M AC[Q A′ , Gid ||idA||T 1||r ]). If C∗ does not
verify then device A aborts the system. For instance, Tom
fabricates a message (e.g., {Gid , CT om, T 1, rT om}) and sends
it to the smart device A. We note that Tom’s fabricated
CT om cannot be passed the verification at the smart device A,
because originally the sub-message C is computed over Q A.
Similarly, HG verifies (idA∗ = idA) the authenticity of device
A by decrypting sub-message NA(= DK A[idA, s, r, T 2])
using key K A, which is only possessed by the HG. Therefore,
to maintain a mutual trust, the proposed scheme achieved
mutual authentication between the device A and the HG.
(2) Session Key Establishment: The proposed scheme
provides a session-key agreement after performing the authen-
tication. A session key established between the HG and device
A (i.e., σ = h(idA||Gid ||s||T 3||T 2||Q A)). It is clear to see
that σ is encrypted in NHG using the secret key (K A), which
is known to only legal parties. In addition, to generate σ the
HG exploits the timing values (s||T 3||T 2), therefore, in each
session σ will be different. 
Proposition: The proposed scheme attained message
confidentiality, integrity, and freshness.
Proof:
(1) Message Confidentiality: In order to prevent the
eavesdropping attack, the scheme provides an adequate con-
fidentiality to their messages, e.g., (C = M AC[Q A, Gid ||
idA||T 1||r ]), (NA = EK A[idA, s, r, T 2]), (tag = H M AC
[Q A′ , idA||Gid ||s||r ||T 2]), and (NHG = EK A[σ, s, T 3]).
In addition, for each device A, there is a unique key
(K A) along with its key-identity (K Aid ) stored at the HG
side (refer Section IV-A, system setup). If the HG finds
the corresponding key of (K Aid ) then decrypts sub-
message NA(= DK A[idA, s, r, T 2]), as described in step: S3
(Section IV-B). Otherwise, HG cannot decrypt the garbled
message.
(2) Message Integrity: With the proposed scheme, the HG
computes a MAC for each response message originating
from it. Notice that the MAC (M AC[Q A, Gid ||idA||T 1||r ])
can only be computed by the legitimate HG that has Q A,
assigned by the SP, as described in the system setup (refer
Section IV-A). If Tom tampers with a MAC, i.e., CT om
(= M ACT om[Q AT om, Gid ||idA||T 1||rT om]) in the request
message, the device A cannot find a corresponding validation
key that can compute a valid MAC for the message, and
therefore Tom’s message will be ignored. Likewise, the HG
also verifies message integrity of the device A by computing
(H M AC[Q A, idA||Gid ||s||r ||T 2]).
(3) Message Freshness: This property ensures whether the
protocol messages are fresh, i.e., recent. It can be noticed, the
proposed scheme exploits the clocks of involved entities that
ensures each message is recent, not replayed. For instance,
request {Gid, C, T 1, r}, response {Kid A, NA, tag, T 2} and
notify {NHG , T 3}, hence, our scheme achieved freshness. 
C. Performance Analysis
This sub-section discusses the performance analysis of
the proposed scheme, and then compares with [14]–[16]
schemes. Note that this paper only focuses on the computation
Fig. 8. Beacon frame format [32].
Fig. 9. Silicon-ID interface using nesC [40].
and communication costs of the authentication and key
establishment phase.
1) Implementation Environment: As a part of a proof of
concept implementation, nesC is used as the development
environment. The nesC is an event-driven programming lan-
guage for the TinyOS platform, which is a component based
operating system and targets the platforms of wireless sensor
networks [40]. The de-facto standard research platforms (i.e.,
smart devices) in smart homes are ZigBee devices [41], [42].
We implemented the proposed scheme on a TelosB platform
that equipped with a 16 bit processor runs at a clock frequency
8 MHz, 48 KB of ROM and 10 KB of RAM [43]. Due
to the ease of implementation, this paper chose the AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) symmetric-key algorithm for
the encryption. AES is the current encryption standard and one
of the broadly integrated/used in CC2420 radios [41]. To verify
the message authentication (integrity), we have used cipher
block chaining (CBC) to construct the message authentication
code (i.e., CBC-MAC). For a hashed message authentication
code (HMAC) operation, we chose SHA-1 [44].
To synchronize the HG and SD local clocks, a time synchro-
nization mechanism is used [32]. Consider the HG is a clock
source of the smart home, the HG loads a beacon frame to the
radio and sends to the SD. The beacon frame includes the local
clock frequency and synchronization information, as shown
in Fig. 8. Upon receiving the beacon frame, SD synchronizes
its clock with the HG. However, the clock synchroniza-
tion is currently outside the scope of this paper, for more
details refer to [32]. In addition, assuming the extreme pes-
simistic conditions, and for the experiment purposes, authors
have set one second transmission delay (i.e.,T = 1)
for device A, and for the HG [45], to detect the replay
attack.
Reading the Silicon-ID from a smart device during the
computation is an issue. To do this, an interface (i.e., DS2411)
being used to read the (ZigBee-based) SD’s Silicon-ID [40],
as shown in Fig. 9.
2) Computation Cost: In this paper, we have implemented
the authentication and key establishment phase considering the
following message sizes, i.e., IDs as 1 byte, MAC size as
4 bytes, random number as 4 bytes, time stamp as 4 bytes,
key size as 16 bytes, and HMAC size as 16 bytes. Due to
the sensor node’s scarcity nature, this paper shows the price
of security overhead (i.e., memory consumption and execution
time) for the SD.
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Fig. 10. Security overhead (memory consumptions and execution time (ms))
of proposed scheme.
TABLE II
ENERGY COSTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
As shown in Fig. 10, security overhead for a SD is signifi-
cantly low — AES, CBC-MAC, and HMAC needs reasonable
RAM and ROM size. Hence, the proposed scheme leaves
an ample storage space on a smart device to execute the
other (smart home) services. In addition, AES, CBC-MAC,
and HMAC operations take 3.6 ms (millisecond), 8.4 ms and
39 ms, respectively, computation time at the device A. The
time complexity of our scheme is much more efficient than
those of the public key based schemes (e.g., [14] and [15])
which need high time complexity for point multiplication
operations.
In order to measure the lightweightness of the proposed
solution, here, we analyzed the energy consumption for the
cryptographic operations, which are performed by the device A
(TelosB). Similar to [41], [46], and [47], we have calculated
the energy (E) consumed by the device A using the formula
E = V × I . Here, V is the voltage of the new batteries (2 AA)
and I is the current of the circuit. For the sake of measurement
purposes, the values V and I may be derived from the (TelosB)
datasheet, 3 V(volt) and 1.8 µA (micro-amp), respectively,
when the processor is in active mode [43]. By multiplying
the values (i.e.,V × I ) with the execution time (t), we
determined the energy consumption for cryptographic oper-
ations, such as encryption, CBC-MAC and HMAC-SHA1.
As shown in Table II, the total computational energy
incurred by the proposed scheme is 275.4µJ (micro-joule).
It can be observed that the impact on energy consumption from
the encryption, CBC-MAC and HMAC-SHA1 computation is
low, i.e., 19.44 µJ, 45.36 µJ, and 210.6 µJ, respectively.
Additionally, Table III summarizes and compares the com-
putational cost of proposed scheme, which is well-suited to a
TABLE III
COMPUTATION COST COMPARISONS
TABLE IV
COMMUNICATION ENERGY COSTS
resource-constrained device, as it requires two hash operations,
one MAC and one HMAC operations, and two cryptosystems
(one encryption and one decryption) to execute the whole pro-
tocol. Whereas, in a similar environment to execute the whole
protocol, Li’s scheme [14] requires two point multiplication
operations, one hash operation and one MAC operation, and
two cryptosystems (one encryption and one decryption), and
Vaidya et al.’s scheme [15] requires two point multiplication
operations and four hash operations. In addition, the point
multiplication operation incurs high time complexity at the
resource-constrained devices. Similarly, Han et al.’s scheme
requires five hash operations, seven MAC operations, and
8 cryptosystems (four encryption and four decryption) [16].
In this perspective the proposed scheme attains reasonable
efficiency in comparison with other protocols.
3) Communication Cost: The communication cost means
the energy spent by a SD (device A) having a packet of a given
size to be transmitted/received. To evaluate the communication
cost for the proposed scheme, we have adopted the energy
model from de Meulenaer et al. [48]. On the TelosB plat-
form, transmitting and receiving a single bit of data required
0.72 µJ and 0.81 µJ, respectively [48]. Table IV shows
the communication energy costs for transmitting (response
{Kid A, NA, tag, T 2}) and receiving (request {Gid, C, T 1, r},
and notify {NHG , T 3}) messages at the SD. It can be seen from
Table IV that the proposed scheme consumes only 430.22 µJ
communication energy to execute the whole scheme, and
therefore achieved communication cost efficiency. In addition,
we have omitted the energy costs at the HG, since it has
enough resources (i.e., computational power and memory) to
compute the complex cryptographic operations.
Furthermore, in Fig. 11, we are summarizing the communi-
cation costs comparisons (in terms of the number of message
exchanges) of the proposed scheme and [14]–[16]. To execute
the whole protocol, Li’s scheme [14] takes four rounds of
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Fig. 11. Communication cost comparisons in terms of the number of message
exchanges.
message exchanges, Vaidya et al.’s scheme needs two message
exchanges [15], and Han et al.’s scheme [16] needs
six rounds for a successful authentication and key establish-
ment, as shown in Fig. 11. Whereas, our scheme requires
three rounds of message exchanges (request, response, and
notify, refer Fig. 4), which are quite practical in such smart
home applications. Thus, considering the security overhead
(i.e., computational and communication costs), it is easy to say
the proposed scheme can be a good alternative for securing
the smart home environments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Indeed, the following recent technology trends for the next
generation smart homes are already well under way — smart
light systems, connected home appliances, home climate-
control systems, demand/response systems for electricity
(smart metering), security and safety systems. It is also worth
noting that the big proportion of elderly population (for better
life living at home) is also increasing. However, an absolute
adoption of the smart homes is still a big concern in the
society, especially, for the elderly inhabitants. One of the major
challenge is the security in smart homes.
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight and secure
session-key establishment scheme focusing on the smart
homes. The formal analysis (using the AVISPA tool) revealed
that the proposed scheme can achieve authentication and
confidentiality, and security goals are as expected. In addition,
the proof of concept demonstrated that a session key is
established in a lightweight way, which is a paramount security
requirement for the smart home environments.
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